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CASE NOTES
UCC, §9-202 which states: "Each provision Of this Article with regard to
rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the
secured party or in the debtor." 18
 Under the UCC, therefore, the court
should not concern itself with the question as to who originally had title
and what were the consequences of an "admission of title" in the debtor
due to the choice of remedies by the creditor.
In discussing the doctrine of inconsistent remedies the Court states at
page 736, "The Pennsylvania Courts have emphasized that distinct remedies
may be used concurrently or alternately if they are consistent in purpose
and kind; they must be inconsistent and not merely cumulative in order for
the selection of one to operate as a bar to the pursuit of the other." This
conclusion is of questionable validity as applied to the clearly indicated
intention of the legislature in adopting § 9-501(1); the intention being that
the remedies contained therein are additional and not substitutional. If it
were intended that such concurrent remedies should not be cumulative but
alternative due to some theoretical inconsistency existing between them
when applied to certain secured agreements the legislature would have un-
doubtedly so indicated. Resistance to change is a human trait which often
finds its way into the courts and often, either consciously or unconsciously,
influences the courts' interpretation of statutes which clearly indicate an
'intention to alter existing law. Such influence is manifest in the Court's
acceptance of that part of the lower court's decision which holds that,
§ 9-501(1) notwithstanding, the doctrine of inconsistent remedies is still
applicable to "bailment lease" and conditional sale arrangements.ul
ROBERT A. GORFINKLE
Subcontracts—Part Performance—Damages.—Albre Marble and Tile
Co., Inc. v. John Bowen Co., Inc. 1—A subcontractor brought an action
against a prime contractor in which there were counts for breach of contract
and quantum meruit. The defendant had previously contracted with the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts for construction of a hospital. In a
prior case2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had held that
contract invalid because Bowen Co. had violated Mass. G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c.149, § 44A-44D by including in its bid smaller sums for the work of
certain subcontractors than the sums specified in their subbids. The plain-
tiff subsequently brought this action in the Superior Court. That court
18 See also Comment appurtenant to this section.
19 Massachusetts and Kentucky, in adopting the UCC in 1957 and 1958 respec-
tively, have adopted the 1957 version which appears to have solved any problem of
ambiguity in § 9-501(1). The 1957 version of § 9-501(1) reads as follows: "When a
debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the remedies pro-
vided by this Part, which are cumulative. In addition he may reduce his claim to
judgment, foreclose the security interest by any available judicial procedure, or
both . . . " (emphasis added). See also the 1957 version which has added § 9-501(5)
which defines the meaning of "foreclose" as used in * 9-501(1).
1 1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 147, 155 N.E.2d 437.
2 Gifford v. Commissioner of Public Health, 328 Mass. 608, 105 N.E.2d 476 (1952).
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granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. The
plaintiff excepted and appealed. HELD: Upheld on breach of contract
counts; reversed and remanded on quantum meruit counts. The plaintiff
is entitled to recover for the value of his expenditures made pursuant to
the specific contract provisions, requiring the furnishing of samples and
drawings for the approval of the defendant. No recovery is permissible for
expenses incurred by the plaintiff prior to the execution •of the contract
in anticipation thereof. •
It is established law that where the defendant has received part per-
formance under • the contract, the fact that the value of this partial perform-
ance has been destroyed by the ,very circumstances which make full per-
formance impossible will .not preclude :recovery.3 Where a supervening
act not chargeable to either party has rendered performance of a building
contract impossible and the part performance of one party exceeds 'that of
the other; the tendency. has been to .allow..recovery for the fair value. of
work done in the actual, performance of the contract and to deny recovery
for expenditures made merely in reliance upon the contract or in preparing
to perform under it. As a variant and limitation of the general principle,
the Massachusetts court. has adopted the rule • that where impossibility. of
- performance occurs, the. plaintiff -can recover only for labor and materials
"wrought into". the structure. : In Young-v..Chicopee recovery was allowed
for lumber which the plaintiff contractor had ; actually used in building a
:.bridge destroyed by fire before completion, but 'denied for lumber which
he had purchased in reliance -on the contract and transported , to the con-
struction scene but , had not yet incorporated into the structure. However,
the court in other litigation has recognized that certain types of performance
by their very nature cannot be "wrought into" a structure. In Angus v.
Scully5 recovery', for, the value, of -services, rendered by , house movers. was
allowed although the house was destroyed midway, in the moving. . .
• In allowing quantum meruit recovery in the present case even though
the tile and marble samples and the 'drawings had not been "wrought into"
the . structure, • the court 'considered two facts to be of great • significance.
First, this is a case in which the defendant, whether. or not he deliberately
•submitted his bids for the' prime contract in violation of law; at least had
a greater involvement in the imposSibility • than did the plaintiff. Logic
thus compels a recognition' of greater weight in the plaintiff's claim than
in those cases where the supervening act is an "act of God" not chargeable
to either party. Secondly, the contract , clause requiring the plaintiff to
submit samples and drawings for approval had the , effect of placing the
plaintiff's preparatory efforts under the supervision of the defendant and
removing them from the sole discretion and control of his subcontractor.
While the court felt that these peculiar .facts justified • its holding in this
case, it refused to lay down the broader principle th4t in, every case re-
. covery may .be had for obligations reasonably incurred in preparation for
3 Williston, Contracts 1977 (Rev. ed. 1936).
4 186 Mass. 518, 72 N.E. 63 (1904). 	 ."
176 Mass. 357, 57 N.E. 674; 49A.L.R. 562 (1900).
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performance of a contract where further performance is rendered impossible
without fault by either party. The court was unwilling to extend the
"wrought in" rule of Young v. Chicopee° to a case where the contractor's
involvement in creating the impossibility was greater than ,that of the sub-
contractor seeking quantum meruit recovery. The basis of the decision
is broadened by the court's analogy of this case, to Angus v. Scully' in that
the services performed (furnishing samples and drawings for approval)
were not of a type that could be "wrought into" the structure. The refer-
ence to the type of services, however, is of a parenthetical nature, and• it
appears that the court would be ready to follow its decision in the present
case in any subsequent case involving the same material facts, even if the
services performed comprised the preparation .of ,materials designed to be
physically incorporated into the, structure. COnsidered in its broader asped
and with a view to its logical implications, this decision shows that, while
the general rule of denial of reliance expenditures in impossibility situations
remains in force, the Massachusetts court is willing to relax the rule, and al-
low recovery where special facts accentuate the justice of the plaintiff's
claim.
HENRY M. •KELLEHER
. 6 Supra note 4.
Supra note 5. , L
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